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AN APPROPRIATE POSTSCRIPT TO TOPCO:
WE WERE JUST KIDDING!
R. BRUCE PHILLiFS*
In perhaps its most sweeping antitrust opinion to date, the 1972 United
States Supreme Court decisively ruled in United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc.' that all horizontal trade restraints are per se illegal.2 Writing for the
majority, Justice Marshall reasoned that this broad proscription would ac-
comodate predictability and avoid burdensomie judicial investigation in the
cases where horizontal restraints are discovered.3 A prior decision left some
doubt whether territorial exclusivity, the restraint at issue in Topco, is per
se illegal when unaccompanied by price fixing.4 The Topco opinion removed
that doubt not only as to territorial restrictions but also as to all horizontal
restraints.5
It is therefore interesting that the Supreme Court has never cited Topco
for its bold per se sentencing of all horizontal restraints.6 It is even more
interesting that the horizontal restraint decisions which followed Topco have
betrayed Justice Marshall's objectives of predictability and relief from burden-
some judicial investigation by exemplifying conspicuous unpredictabilty and
© 1988 R. Bruce Phillips.
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The author expresses his gratitude to D. Kent Meyers, Adjunct Professor of Law at the
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for valuable insights concerning this article.
1. 405 U.S. 596 (1972) [hereinafter Topco].
2. Id. at 608. A restraint of trade is traditionally considered "horizontal" when it is by
agreement between competitors and "vertical" when it is by agreement between persons at dif-
ferent levels of distribution (e.g., manufacturers and distributors). See Business Elec. Corp. v.
Sharp Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1575, 1523 (1988); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (NCAA)
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984); Topco, 405 U.S. at 608. But
see Business Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1526-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Business Elec. Corp.,
a manufacturer terminated its relationship with one distributor upon an ultimatum of another
distributor. The dissent argued that this restraint was horizontal because its anticompetitive ef-
fects were identical to those of an agreement between two distributors to demand that their sup-
plier terminate its relationship with a third distributor. Id. Contra id. at 1522 n.4.
3. Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.10 & 610-12.
4. Id. at 609 n.9; United States v. Sealy Corp., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
5. Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.9.
6. The United States Supreme Court has cited Topco in the following instances: (i) for the
proposition that a horizontal agreement to divide territories is per se illegal (Business Elec. Corp.
v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1524 (1988) (dictum)); (ii) as authority for the definition
of a "horizontal restraint" (NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99
n.18 (1984)); (iii) in holding that "lilt is only after considerable experience with certain business
relationships that courts classify them as per se violations .... " (NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100 n.21;
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) v. Columbia Broadcast System, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)); and (iv)
for its identification of the virtues of the per se rule (BMI, 441 U.S. at 8 n.11).
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only minimal restraint of judicial analysis. Thus, the Topco decision stands
at a crossroads. The Court has not expressly overruled or qualified its holdings;
yet, Topco has clearly failed as an adjudicative basis for subsequent cases.
This failure raises doubt concerning the decisions present validity.
Until recently, it seemed that the Court had simply forgotten Topco.1
However, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,' a 1988
Supreme Court vertical restraint case, the majority mysteriously cited Topco
for its condemnation of horizontal market divisions.9 It is questionable why
the Court cited Topco in a vertical restraint case when the previous horizon-
tal restraint cases failed to even cite Topco's principal holding. 10
Topco's obscure coordinates make for an intriguing study of its probable
destiny. More importantly, an examination of the history and developments
surrounding Topco should provide antitrust lawyers insight into the Court's
progress with horizontal restraint law and the wisdom or errancy of its pres-
ent views. Part I of this article focuses on prior case history by reviewing
the law on horizontal restraints that was available to the Topco Court. Part
II examines and critiques Topco. Part III analyzes the developments that
followed and juxtaposes the present law with popular perceptions of the law.
Finally, Part IV surmises how Topco would be decided today and proposes
a method of analysis by which Topco ought to be adjudicated. This article
not only explores the continuing validity of Topco, but generally emphasizes
that today's antitrust law has been shaped by three independent models of
trade restraint analysis-the ancillary restraints doctrine, the rule of reason
and the per se rule.
I. The Law on Horizontal Restraints Available to the Topco Court
Addyston Pipe & Steel: The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
Nearly 200 years of common law laid the foundation for the Sherman Act,'
a cornerstone of American antitrust law.1 2 Eight years after its enactment,
7. The Court had not cited Topco in recent horizontal restraint cases as authority for any
position. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986);
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
8. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
9. Id. at 1524.
10. See supra notes 6-7.
11. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)). Section
1, the provision relevant to this article, reads as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
12. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,




Judge William Howard Taft (later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 3 ) wisely
looked to the common law for guidance in evaluating a horizontal trade
restraint under the Act in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co." In
Addyston Pipe & Steel, the defendants, manufacturers and vendors of cast-
iron pipe, entered into an agreement to raise pipe prices over most of the
United States. The defendants controlled over 55% of the total cast-iron pro-
ducing industry and about 65% of the relevant market.15 Judge Taft, writing
for the Sixth Circuit, ruled that the agreement was per se illegal, because its
sole purpose was to restrain trade and thereby diminish competition.
6
Judge Taft prudentially clarified, however, that not all restraints of trade,
whether horizontal or vertical, are per se illegal. Explaining that some restraints
can be reasonable, he framed a criterion, known as the ancillary restraints
doctrine, by which such restraints are to be adjudged:
[I]t would certainly seem to follow from the tests laid down for
determining the validity of such an agreement that no conventional
restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying
it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract,
and necessary to protect the convenantee in the enjoyment of the
legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers
of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party.' 7
The inquiry, Judge Taft elaborated, should not focus on the trade restraint
itself. Rather, a court ruling on the legality of a restraint should examine
the main purpose of the transaction or contract which the restraint is designed
to enhance.' 8 As Judge Taft reasoned, "[t]he main purpose of the contract
suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform
standard by which the validity of such restraints may be judicially deter-
mined." 19 Once a court resolves the legitimacy of a contract's main purpose,
the restraint must be determined ancillary-subordinate and collateral20-to
that main purpose to be exempt from the per se rule of illegality. 2'
American antitrust law derives from early cases such as Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. iVms. 181,
24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711). See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 688-89 (1978) (references by J. Stevens).
13. 257 U.S. iii n.2.
14. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
15. Id. at 291-92.
16. Id. at 283. The Court added that the policy of the common law had been to foster com-
petition. Id.
17. Id. at 282.
18. Id. at 282-83.
19. Id. at 282.
20. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033. Judge Bork described an "ancillary restraint" as follows:
The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral in the sense that it serves to
make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose. Of course,
the restraint imposed must be related to the efficiency sought to be achieved. If
it is so broad that part of the restraint suppresses competition without creating
efficiency, the restraint is, to that extent, not ancillary.
Id.
21. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282.
1989]
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Addyston Pipe & Steel, unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court, 2 fur-
nished courts with a balanced model for trade restraint analysis. A restraint
may be entirely reasonable not because it is procompetitive 2 -the restraint
itself may be only anticompetitive-but because it complements a transaction
that has a legitimate purpose which would be impotent without the restraint.
The ancillary restraints doctrine can be used to determine whether the restraint
restricts competition only to the degree necessary to effect the main purpose
of the transaction. By such an analysis, the total effect on competition can
be measured, not just the effect of the restraint. Accordingly, Addyston Pipe
& Steel limited per se condemnation to naked restraints. A restraint is "naked"
when its illegitimate purpose outweighs any legitimate purpose of an underly-
ing contract or when its existence is unnecessary for the fruition of the con-
tract."'
The Rule of Reason
The rule of reason, a second model for trade restraint analysis was formally
introduced in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.25 This model,
like the ancillary restraints doctrine, was predicated on the common law no-
tion that some restraints deserve analysis and some remain inherently
unreasonable beyond potential justification through an exercise of judgment.26
Perhaps the most famous expression of the rule of reason was announced
by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States:"
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save
an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret the facts and
to predict consequences.28
22. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235 (1899).
23. Cf. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The Court asserted
that restraint is the very essence of any agreement concerning trade. Id. at 238.
24. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282.
25. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
26. Id. at 64-65. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs J 144, 302(c) (3d ed. 1981).
27. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
28. Id. at 238.
7- 432 [Vol. 42
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Standard Oil held that section 129 of the Sherman Act defers the deter-
mination of whether an activity is within its contemplation to the reasoning
of the court, guided by "principles of law" and public policy. 0 Chicago Board
of Trade established the characteristics of a reasonable restraint: the restraint
must merely regulate; its only possible consequence should be to promote com-
petition; and a restraint which may suppress or destroy competition is
unreasonable, because its purpose and possible effect exceed mere regulation.
Chicago Board of Trade also provided guidelines on the scope and extent
of a rule of reason inquiry into the purpose and effect of a restraint.
Judges and antitrust scholars have not openly articulated the distinctions
between the ancillary restraints doctrine and the rule of reason. Perhaps they
believe that any distinctions between the models are inconsequential. Perhaps
authorities are simply unaware of the differences and therefore interrelate the
models.3 However, at least two distinctions differentiate the ancillary restraints
doctrine from the rule of reason.
The first and primary distinction regards the central focus of each model.
The fundamental inquiry under the rule of reason is whether the challenged
restraint itself enhances competition.32 Yet, the foremost inquiry under the
ancillary restraints doctrine is whether there exists a lawful contract having
a legitimate main purpose. 3 The ancillary restraints doctrine then evaluates
the restraint by determining not whether it is procompetitive but whether it
is ancillary to the lawful contract and necessary for the contract's legitimate
potency. 4 The ancillary restraints doctrine impliedly assumes that all restraints
are anticompetitive. Accordingly, the doctrine weighs the adverse character
of the restraint against the procompetitive virtues of the legitimate contract.
29. See supra note 11.
30. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 221 U.S. at 63-64.
31. See, e.g., Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1526-29 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982); United
States v. Sealy Corp., 388 U.S. 350, 356 (1967); National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc.,
779 F.2d 592, 599-603 (l1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923; General Leaseways, Inc.
v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1984); Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: Horizon-
tal Restraints, Efficiency and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1019, 1025-30 (1986) [hereinafter
Antitrust Developments]; Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by "Facial Examination"
of Restraints: The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 W'AsH. L. Rnv.
1, 22-24 (1984) [hereinafter Streamlining Antitrust]. Cf. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas
Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224-30, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (J. Bork reconciling the rule
of reason with the ancillary restraints doctrine out of apparent acquiescence to the uncertain
modem state of the law on trade restraints). The Court's confusion between the ancillary restraints
doctrine and the rule of reason is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 52-53.
32. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104; Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. See also NCAA,
468 U.S. at 103 & 109 n.39.
33. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282-83.
34. Id.
1989]
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The ancillary restraints doctrine, because of its central focus, can result
in a finding contrary to that derived by analysis under the rule of reason.
In a given scenario involving a plainly anticompetitive horizontal restraint,
a strict analysis under the rule of reason may result in a finding of
unreasonableness. However, under the ancillary restraints doctrine, this same
restraint may be held valid, if it is determined to be ancillary to a legitimate
main transaction and necessary for that transaction's fruition."
A second distinction between the ancillary restraints doctrine and the rule
of reason concerns the role of the per se rule of illegality in each. A court
applying the ancillary restraints doctrine must impose the per se rule-it must
rule the restraint inherently and inescapably illegal36-if the restraint exceeds
the legitimate necessity presented by the main purpose of the lawful contract.3 7
Justice Brandeis' rule of reason, on the other hand, is a test unto itself; if
the restraint fails the test, it fails only under a rule of reason analysis, and
the per se rule is not then formally introduced to reinforce or define the con-
demnation. 38 Perhaps this distinction is merely academic. Even so, note that
Justice Brandeis, in Chicago Board of Trade, credited no role in the develop-
ment of antitrust analysis to Addyston Pipe & Steel or the ancillary restraints
doctrine. It appears therefore that Justice Brandeis constructed his model of
trade restraint scrutiny not upon the ancillary restraints doctrine but rather
alongside it.
The Per Se Rule
The per se rule emerged as a third model, independent of other models,
for the adjudication of trade restraints in Northern Pacific Railway v. United
States.39 In Northern Pacific, the Supreme Court held that, where a restraint
has a pernicious effect upon competition and lacks any redeeming virtue, this
justifies a conclusive presumption of per se illegality without elaborate
economic analysis of the restraint. 0 Northern Pacific inaugurated a novel
35. For the importance of this distinction to Topco, see infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
36. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282-83.
37. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs 302(c) (3d ed. 1981) (comparison between Standard
Oil and Addyston Pipe & Steel).
38. See Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (indication that the exercise of judgment
can result in either a finding for or against a restraint). See also Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986); NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). The Court in each case
rejected the restraint expressly under the rule of reason. For a discussion of the validity of the
analysis in these decisions, see infra notes 168-201 and accompanying text.
39. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
40. Id. at 5. The Court added:
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone
concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and pro-
longed economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as
well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular





device for presuming certain horizontal restraints illegal-categorical illegal-
ity. Justice Black, writing for the majority, listed several trade practices which
the Court had declared per se illegal,4 including price fixing,42 division of
markets, 43 group boycotts" and tying arrangements.4 5 Having presented his
per se doctrine and category of historically illegal restraints in one breath,' 6
Justice Black effectively held that a judicial search for the legitimacy of any
price fixing arrangement, division of markets, group boycott or tying arrange-
ment is overly complex, costly and usually fruitless. 47
Northern Pacific's blacklist seemingly disquieted the Supreme Court in subse-
quent opinions. For example, United States v. Sealy Corp.4 8 held a hybrid
of price fixing and division of markets, both blacklisted restraints, to be per
se illegal. 4'9 However, despite the fact that Northern Pacific held division of
markets categorically illegal, the Sealy Court had trouble ruling that territorial
division was per se illegal independent of its annexation with price fixing.50
Because of this struggle, Sealy cast doubt on whether a horizontal division
of markets is by itself a per se violation of the Sherman Act."
41. Id.
42. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Price fixing represents
agreements between competitors (horizontal agreements) or between suppliers and distributors
(vertical agreements) to fix the prices at which they sell their products. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc.
v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222-23;
Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Co-op Ass'n, 326 F. Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
43. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Topco
defined a horizontal division of markets ("territorial division," "territorial exclusivity") as "an
agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories
in order to minimize competition." Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
44. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). A
group boycott, or "concerned refusal to deal," occurs where two or more competitors (horizon-
tal scheme) or a supplier and distributor (vertical scheme) agree to boycott or refuse to deal
with another competitor or another distributor. Such agreements have been made for a variety
of actionable purposes. See, e.g., Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (various
suppliers and a distributor agreed to not sell to another distributor or to sell to the other at
discriminatory prices and terms); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S.
30 (1930) (film producers agreed to deal only with exhibitors who entered into a certain standard
exhibition contract); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600 (1914) (retailer association circulated among its members a "blacklist" of wholesalers who
had sold directly to consumers).
45. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). A "tying arrangement"
is an agreement whereby a seller conditions the sale of one product, the "tying product," on
the purchase of another product, the "tied product." Northern Paec. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5-6; Northern
v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1344 (8th Cir. 1976). Northern Pacific concerned whether
the restraint at issue was an illegal tying arrangement. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 3-4.
46. See Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
47. Id.
48. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
49. Id. at 354-57.
50. See id. at 356-57.
51. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.9. This doubt was temporarily resolved in Topco which
ruled, partly on the basis of categorization, that a division of markets was independently per
se illegal. Id. at 608 & 609 n.9.
1989]
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Sealy is further notable for two supplemental points. First, the Supreme
Court finally unmasked its confusion over the distinction between an ancillary
restraints inquiry and a rule of reason inquiry. The appellee argued that the
territorial restraints at issue were "mere incidents of a lawful program of
trademark licensing." 2 This position is clearly an ancillary restraints argu-
ment, as is evidenced by the focus on a lawful arrangement to which the
restraints were asserted ancillary. However, the Sealy majority misread the
appellee's contention, stating, "it may be true, as appellee vigorously argues,
that territorial exclusivity served many other purposes." 3 The Court inter-
preted the appellee's argument to mean that the restraint was itself legitimate.
The appellee, to the contrary, argued that the restraint was merely ancillary
to a legitimate arrangement. Thus, the Northern Pacific per se rule inadvertent-
ly preempted the ancillary restraints doctrine relied upon by the appellee in
Sealy.
Of more obvious relevance to this article's forthcoming analysis of Topco,
the Supreme Court in Topco characterized Sealy as "on all fours." 4 Interesting
therefore is the Sealy majority's reaction when pressed with a hypothetical
situation strangely congruent to Topco:
It is urged upon us that we should condone this territorial limita-
tion among manufacturers of Sealy products because of the absence
of any showing that it is unreasonable. It is argued, for example,
that a number of small grocers might allocate territory among
themselves on an exclusive basis as incident to the use of a com-
mon name and common advertisements, and that this sort of ven-
ture should be welcomed in the interests of competition, and should
not be condemned as per se unlawful. But condemnation of ap-
pellee's territorial arrangements certainly does not require us to
go so far as to condemn that quite different situation, whatever
might be the result if it were presented to us for decision."
Sealy clearly suggested that condemnation of territorial limitations which
foreshadowed those in Topco would be predicated on the facts of the case.
According to Sealy, an adjudication of the legality of the hypothetical restraint
would compel a court to analyze the restraint. However, the assumption created
by Sealy stands in stark contrast to the holding merely five years later in Topco
that territorial limitations are per se illegal as a matter of law"' without the
slightest hope of potential justification through the analysis suggested by Sealy.
Summary of Analytic Models Available to the Topco Court
In summary, the Topco Court had to its avail three popular models of trade
restraint analysis. An analysis under the ancillary restraints doctrine apparently
52. Sealy Corp., 388 U.S. at 356 (citation omitted).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Topco, 405 U.S. at 609.
55. Sealy Corp., 388 U.S. at 357 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).




requires of a court the following steps: (1) to initially ascertain the existence
of a lawful contract and the legitimacy of its main purpose; (2) to determine
if the restraint at issue is ancillary by ascertaining whether the restraint func-
tioned with the necessity presented by the main purpose; and (3) to determine
the necessity of the restraint for the fruition of the lawful contract. If the
restraint is found unreasonable, then a court will not exempt the restraint
from illegality under the per se rule. 7
An analysis under the rule of reason involves an entirely different focus
than the ancillary restraints doctrine. A court is to focus only on the restraint
and inquire whether the restraint merely regulated and possessed procompetitive
tendencies or whether it possessed anticompetitive tendencies. This inquiry
involves an extensive analysis of the many circumstances surrounding the
restraint.
Finally, the Topco Court had to its avail an independently applied per se
rule. This model mandates inherent and unavoidable illegality and, in Topco's
day, had gained judicial popularity largely due to Northern Pacific. Northern
Pacific compiled a list of restraints, such as territorial divisions, which merited
conclusive denunciation. However, Sealy cast doubt on whether any one of
Northern Pacific's restraints, unaccompanied by price fixing, would be per
se illegal.
II. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.
Topco was a cooperative association wholly owned and controlled by twenty-
five small to medium sized grocery chains operating in some thirty-three
states. 8 The association was organized in 1944 in reaction to the rivalries of
the marketplace." A few large national supermarket chains dominated the
retail grocery business. 6 As the large chains grew, independent grocers and
smaller chains disappeared at an accelerated rate.61
The success of the large supermarket chains was perhaps chiefly due to
their exploitation of "private label" products. 62 Virtually every chain had an
extensive program by which it marketed broad lines of goods bearing its own
labels. 63 An efficient program was often accomplished by vertically integrating
sources of manufacturing, supply, packaging, product testing and so forth.
6
4
The numerous cost economies achieved by vertically integrating sources resulted
in a myriad of advantages. These advantages included the creation and reten-
tion of customer loyalty, by offering exclusive low-priced brands equivalent
57. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282-83.
58. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1032, 1039 (N.D. Ii. 1970),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
59. Id. at 1032-34. The association originated as Food Cooperative, Inc.
60. Id. at 1034 n.19. "In 1967, sales of the 25 largest supermarket chains represented 85.6
per cent of total supermarket chain sales." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1035.
63. Id. at 1039.
64. See id. at 1032, 1034-35.
19891
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in quality to higher-priced national brands and the establishment of a broad
supply base of manufacturers."
Private label programs were considered an essential element in supermarket
competition." However, a single company could not afford to launch a com-
petitively effective program unless it grossed a minimum annual sales volume
of $250 million.67 Most Topco members grossed well under $100 million each. 68
Thus, Topco was organized for the principal purpose of providing, through
its members' combined purchasing power, an efficient program that would
enable each member to genuinely compete with the large supermarket chains
located in its market territory.
69
Through Topco's cooperative buying efforts, its members could purchase
over 1000 different inventory items. 70 Most of these items were sold under
brand names owned by Topco."' Members purchased the goods at costs
equivalent to those incurred by their large rivals. Topco members used the
resulting cost savings, which had been enjoyed only by the large chains, to
retail their goods at competitive consumer prices.
7 2
Topco's efforts proved successful. By 1967, its members' combined retail
sales exceeded $2.3 billion; only A&P, Safeway and Kroger boasted greater
retail sales. 73 The local market share respective to each member averaged 6%,
ranging from 1 % to 16%. 7 Goods purchased from Topco accounted for
about 10% of the members' total sales. Goods actually bearing Topco brands
accounted for only 6% of the members' total sales.
7
1
Topco members believed that the effectiveness of any private label pro-
gram, whether undertaken by a cooperative or a single chain, depended upon
exclusivity. 76 They contended that private labeling would no longer serve its
competitive, "private" function if Topco members shared each other's primary
markets. 77 The Topco brand would no longer serve to distinguish a member's
store and develop and hold customer loyalty if another member around the
corner offered the same brand. 7 The competitive value of and the member's
investment in his private label program would be destroyed or severely im-
paired.
7 9
65. Id. at 1035; Topco, 405 U.S. at 599 n.3.
66. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1035, 1039.
67. Id. at 1036.
68. Id. at 1033.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1032, 1039.
71. Id.
72. Topco, 405 U.S. at 598-99 & n.3. See Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1035-36.
73. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1033.
74. Id. at 1033, 1039.
75. Id.







For these reasons, each new member signed an agreement with Topco,
designating the territory in which that member could market Topco-brand
products. Generally, no member could sell or offer for sale those products
outside its designated territory.8" Members were free to expand into each other's
territories and market other brands, and they often did so; but they could
not sell Topco-brand items in those territories in which they held no license.81
However, as members grew to the point where they could independently
develop a successful private label program of their own, they usually left
Topco.82 For this reason and more, Topco constantly sought new members
either to be placed in vacant market areas or to replace withdrawing members. 3
Many grocers would not have joined Topco had it not assured them ex-
clusive rights to market Topco-brand products in their primary marketing
areas.84 Nevertheless, the government challenged Topco's practice of market
exclusivity under section 1 of the Sherman Act, contending that the territorial
restraints operated to prohibit competition in Topco-brand products among
Topco members.s The government conceded that were Topco a single chain,
instead of a cooperative buying organization, none of its practices would be
objectionable under the antitrust laws.86 It also conceded that Topco's private
label program actually increased competition in the supermarket industry by
enabling its members to successfully compete with larger regional and na-
tional chains. 7 The government argued, however, that any agreement for ter-
ritorial exclusivity is prohibited by section 1 without regard to its overall ef-
fect on competition. 8
The Topco district court framed the issue as:
whether the anti-trust laws prohibit practices by a cooperative buy-
ing organization which may reduce competition between its
members or potential members in the sale of private label brands
but which enable its members to compete more effectively with
national chains whose private label brands are sold exclusively
through their own outlets.8 9
The court found that whatever anticompetitive effect the division of markets
may have had on intrabrand competition was far outweighed by the increased
80. Id. at 1036-37, 1039; Topco, 405 U.S. at 601-02.
81. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1036-37.
82. Id. at 1038-39.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1036, 1040, 1043.
85. Id. at 1040; Topco, 405 U.S. at 603. The government also challenged Topco's restrictions
on the freedom of its members to sell at wholesale. Topco, 405 U.S. at 603-04, 612. Those
subsidiary challenges are not addressed in this article.
86. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1041. The government cited five Supreme Court cases to support its proposition. Id.
89. Id. at 1042-43.
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ability of Topco members to compete with other supermarket chains.90 The
opinion reasoned that a ruling in favor of the government would substan-
tially diminish competition in the supermarket industry, would benefit only
the large national chains, and would not increase competition in Topco
brands.9' For these reasons, the district court concluded Topco's licensing pro-
visions were "ancillary and subordinate to the fulfillment of the legitimate,
procompetitive purpose of the Topco cooperative, reasonable and in the public
interest." 92
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the district
court's judgment.9 3 Justice Marshall, for the majority, held that horizontal
restraints are per se violations of the Sherman Act regardless of their
reasonableness.9 ' Because Topco's territorial restrictions were horizontal-
between competitors at the same level in the market structure9 9-they were
per se illegal, even though unaccompanied by price fixing.96
Topco is notable for extending Northern Pacific's doctrine of categoriza-
tion and thereby removing the doubt created in Sealy as to whether a division
of markets unaccompanied by price fixing is conclusively per se illegal. 7
However, the panacea that the Topco majority developed to review the ad-
judication of Topco's restrictions was grounded upon some baseless
assumptions.
The Court preceded the substance of its opinion by rejecting an application
of the rule of reason, which the Court alleged the district court applied in
its analysis of Topco. 9 This allegation is simply untrue. A rule of reason
inquiry would have led the lower court to analyze the territorial restraint not
only for its anticompetitive tendencies, which the district court did analyze,
but also for its procompetitive potential,99 which the district court did not
analyze. A rule of reason analysis might well have resulted in a finding against
Topco at trial. The division of markets had clear potential to suppress or
destroy intrabrand competition. Moreover, absent the underlying legitimate
purpose of the Topco cooperative, the restraint lacked any procompetitive
possibility.
However, it was not the rule of reason which buttressed Topco's defense
or the district court's holding. Rather, the defendant and, more importantly,
the court rested their positions on the ancillary restraints doctrine. The district
court never held, as the Supreme Court majority maintained, that Topco's
territorial divisions were procompetitive.' °° Rather, the court held that,
90. Id. at 1043.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1038.
93. Topco, 405 U.S. at 612.
94. Id. at 607-08.
95. Id. at 609. See supra note 2.
96. Id. at 608, 609 n.9.
97. Id. at 609 n.9.
98. Id. at 606, 608.
99. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.




although the restraints were anticompetitive, they were ancillary to the fulfill-
ment of the main purpose of the Topco cooperative." ' This main purpose,
held the district court, was not only legitimate, it was procompetitive and
even in the consumers' interest!t1 2
Thus, Topco at the trial court level demonstrates the crucial distinction be-
tween the ancillary restraints doctrine and the rule of reason. 0 3 Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court failed to recognize this distinction and rejected a rule of
reason analysis when it was not there to reject. One commentator suggests
that the Court may have intentionally ignored the ancillary restraints doctrine
believing that market division among potential competitors, who were so large
and numerous that they could not have merged, was so intentionally restric-
tive as to preclude even a claim under the doctrine. 1 4 While this might be
true, a claim was made under the doctrine; the trial court applied and rested
its opinion on the doctrine; and further, it seems that the dominance of the
doctrine at the trial court level would have prompted some discussion by the
Supreme Court on the merit and relevance of its application. Tlierefore, if
one does not accept the proposition that the Supreme Court inadvertently
misinterpreted the district court's analysis, it is plausible that the majority
intended, by avoiding discussion of the ancillary restraints doctrine, to eliminate
it as a model for antitrust analysis.
Topco climactically held that because the territorial restraint involved was
a horizontal one, it was "therefore ... a per se violation of Section 1" of
the Sherman Act.105 Justice Marshall in his conclusion relied upon a line of
cases, including Northern Pacific,106 which he asserted supports the immutable
rule that every horizontal restraint is per se illegal. Topco's dogma, however,
went far beyond precedent, which had never automatically denounced all
horizontal restraints.'0 7 Topco thus represents the pinnacle of the Court's in-
flexibility regarding horizontal restraints.
One of the reasons for developing the per se rule, the Court explained,
was that courts are incapable of competently weighing procompetitive effects
in one economic sector against anticompetitive effects in another.' 8 It would
101. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1038, 1043.
102. Id. Justice Marshall stated that courts are of "limited utility" in weighing destruction
of competition in one economic sector against promotion of competition in another. Id. However,
in Topco, the district court found that the anticompetitive source was ancillary to the procompetitive
source. Justice Marshall did not controvert the validity of this finding, so it is therefore difficult
to understand his inability to meaningfully weigh the economic inputs.
103. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
104. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and
Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music? 66 VA. L. REv. 879, 892-93 (1980).
105. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
106. Id. at 608. In dissenting, Chief Justice Burger carefully distinguished each of these cases
and charged that the majority contrived a new per se rule with no reliable basis on precedent.
Id. at 613-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
107. See supra note 106.
108. Id. at 609-11. Were this true in its literal sense, there could be no operative rule of reason
or ancillary restraints doctrine. Both are predicated on the assumption that courts must be equipped,
in many instances, to make this determination. See id. at 620-22, 624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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seem therefore that the more experience a court has with a certain restraint
and business environment the better equipped and willing it would be to deter-
mine the effects of the restraint on the balance of competition. Yet, the ma-
jority asserted, in apparent reference to White Motor Co. v. United States,'",
that courts can classify a particular business practice a per se violation of
the Sherman Act only when it has "considerable experience" with that prac-
tice."
These rationales present an interesting dichotomy. The more experience a
court has with a particular restraint the more likely that restraint will not
escape the court's presumption of illegality. On the other hand, the less ex-
perience a court has with a restraint, the more likely the court will deem itself
incapable of weighing the economic effects of the restraint and its underlying
main transaction, thus again strengthening justification for the per se rule.
Certainly the Supreme Court could not have intended such an illogical pro-
clivity for the per se rule in horizontal restraint cases. Yet, the majority did
hold that if a restraint is horizontal, it is conclusively illegal. Perhaps this
chaos in Topco reveals why the case is so rarely cited by the Supreme Court
and all but forsaken for its condemnation of all horizontal restraints.' Despite
the purported magnitude of Topco's ruling," 2 time has proven Justice
Marshall's opinion to be of little significance to the subsequent development
of antitrust law.
For more substantive reasons given above, however, the Court's ruling in
Topco is faulty. The Court exchanged a sound district court holding, perhaps
on an inexcusable misinterpretation of the opinion, for an inflexible rule con-
structed upon impulsive reasoning. As Chief Justice Burger noted in his dis-
sent, the majority did not charge that the district court's findings and conclu-
sions were incorrect; the opinion simply held that the district court had no
business analyzing Topco's practices."' This holding indicates that the ma-
jority acquiesced to the validity of the lower court's findings and conclusions,
ruling only that the court was unwarranted in making the analysis. If the
majority could not controvert that the procompetitive benefits of both the
Topco cooperative and the private label program on interbrand competition
outweighed any anticompetitive effects of the restraint on intrabrand com-
petition, then no legally valid interpretation of the Sherman Act indicates fault
in the district court's decision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have
affirmed the district court's opinion.
109. 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963).
110. Topco, 405 U.S. at 607-08 (citing Van Cize, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law,
50 VA. L. Rav. 1165 (1964)).
111, See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 51 and text accompanying note 97.




III. Post-Topco Developments of the Law on Horizontal Restraints
The Rule of Reason-Ancillary Restraints Doctrine Distinction
Although the Supreme Court ignored the ancillary restraints doctrine in
Sealy and Topco," 4 it finally voiced its position on the role of the doctrine
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States."5 Justice
Stevens asserted for the majority that, in Addystone Pipe & Steel, Judge Taft
formulated the ancillary restraints doctrine from his understanding of a historic
common-law rule of reason."I6 Justice Stevens concluded that the rule of reason
and the per se rule are the only two operative models of antitrust analysis."'
Stevens recently reiterated this position in his dissenting opinion in Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp."I8 In this vertical restraint case,
he argued that ancillary restraints "are perfectly lawful unless the 'rule of
reason' is violated.""19 His proclamation seems to suggest that the ancillary
restraints doctrine and the rule of reason have merged.
This point of Stevens' dissent is quite similar to, and perhaps annotative
of, the majority's view in Business Electronics. Citing GTE Sylvania, the ma-
jority explained that the rule of reason is nothing more than a fact
determination:
Ordinarily, whether particular concerted action violates (section)
1 of the Sherman Act is determined through case-by-case applica-
tion of the so-called rule of reason-that is, "the factfinder weighs
all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint
on competition."' 2
At quick glance, the foregoing statement may appear inoffensive. However,
if the rule of reason merely constitutes a broad consideration of all facts
presented at trial and the per se rule represents a court's refusal to consider
the facts, then what remaining utility has the ancillary restraints doctrine?
If the rule of reason is really a plenary fact determination, then there is no
room for the ancillary restraints doctrine. Any analysis under the doctrine
could instead be integrated within the broader analysis under the rule of reason.
Perhaps Judge Taft was not one to quarrel over whether his ancillary
restraints doctrine should be set apart from other models of trade restraint
scrutiny. Yet, the real point is that, regardless whether Judge Taft cared how
his formulation was recognized or titled, its intended focus and effect on a
114. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53 and 98-104.
115. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
116. Id. at 689.
117. Id. at 691-92.
118. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1527.
120. Id. at 1516 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
See also id. at 1523.
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case's outcome differs significantly from that of the rule of reason announced
in Chicago Board of Trade.121 It makes no sense therefore to merge the two
models, unless courts better emphasize whether they uphold or reject a par-
ticular restraint because of the restraint's own competitive merit or rather
because of an evaluation of its ability to further the legitimate main purpose
of an underlying contract.
Because courts appear to have not yet reached this level of specificity in
antitrust analysis, and because the GTE Sylvania and Business Electronics
majorities offered no explanation for their words, it seems therefore that the
Court's latest definition of the rule of reason is, at best, unwitting. If so,
then the Court has probably left the ancillary restraints doctrine unaltered.
In its misunderstanding of the independent magnitude of the doctrine, the
Court has contributed nothing to the doctrine's development and detracted
nothing from its proper role in trade restraint analysis.
In Business Electronics, the Court contributed more to the ancillary restraints
doctrine in one footnote than it had in nearly one hundred years of case law.
The doctrine, as originally framed in Addyston Pipe & Steel, held that a valid
trade restaint must be ancillary to the legitimate main purpose presented by
a lawful contract. The Business Electronics dissent seemed to complain about
the lack of an express contractual obligation to which the restraint could have
attached. In response, the majority commented in dicta that a valid restraint
may be ancillary to a relationship'23 and need not formally accompany a con-
tractual provision.'24 The Court reasoned that to require "manufacturers to
agree to otherwise inefficient contractual provisions for the sole purpose of
attaching to them efficient nonprice vertical restraints ... would ... create
precisely the kind of 'irrational dislocation in the market' that legal rules in
this area should be designed to avoid."' 25
Although Justice Scalia did not express whether his analysis in Business
Electronics extends to horizontal restraints, his assertion that, to be valid,
a restraint need only reinforce a business relationship, not a contract, is sound.
An economically beneficial main purpose does not necessarily flow only from
a contractual provision expressed between parties to a preexisting commercial
relationship. The very relationship itself could be impotent without the at-
tachment of a restraint qualifying its terms. For example, the relationship
between the grocers in Topco might not have been possible without restric-
tions, such as the territorial limitations, qualifying its terms.' 2 ' Assuming this
is true, requiring a group such as that in Topco to create some unnecessary
covenent to which the restrictions must attach for validity is overly formalistic,
probably beyond the contemplation of Judge Taft, and beyond common
reasoning.
121. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
122. See supra text accompanying note 17.
123. Business Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1522 n.3 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 187, 188 (1981)).
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).




The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule
Unlike the ancillary restraints doctrine, the rule of reason and the per se
rule have undergone developments which are significant to a reanalysis of
Topco. Among the illustrative cases to be discussed, Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcast SystemI27 presents a few of these developments. Broad-
cast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP) were each created as a clearinghouse through which
authors and composers could collectively license and police the masses of users
and performers of copyrighted works.'12 Both companies issued blanket licenses
which gave the licensees the right to perform any and all of the compositions
owned by members and affiliates for a stated term. Each license was sold
at a predetermined fee.12 9 One of the giant licensees, Columbia Broadcasting
System ("CBS"), brought a suit challenging that the blanket licenses were
instruments of illegal price fixing.'
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's imposition of the per se
rule as "overly simplistic" and held that the rule of reason should apply.13'
The BMI majority explained that the Court and the Second Circuit had not
examined this type of case and therefore did not have the "considerable ex-
perience" necessary for an application of the per se rule."' However, it is
apparent that the Court opted for a rule of reason analysis for reasons more
compelling than the Court's alleged inadequate experience.
Blanket licensing developed as an efficient mechanism to bring order to
a marketplace of innumerable sole participants.' 33 It resulted in lower costs
and simplified the total copyright licensing process of negotiation and en-
forcement, thereby creating procompetitive efficiencies. 3 " Moreover, blanket
licensing was an acceptable method of copyright licensing for a large part
of the market. 3 ' The restraint's own efficiencies would therefore have
redeemed it from per se illegality without the aiding justification of the Court's
inexperience.
The insignificance of the "considerable experience" theory in BMP36 is fur-
ther emphasized by the majority's seven-page synopsis of the intensive scrutiny
that blanket licensing and ASCAP had received by the Justice Department,
Congress and the Ninth Circuit. 3 7 Although any experience attributable to
127. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
128. Id. at 4-5.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 4, 6.
131. Id. at 8-9, 24.
132. Id. at 9-10. The Court cited Topco, 405 U.S. at 607-08, to justify its reluctance of impos-
ing the per se rule without "considerable experience." This is BMPs only reference to Topco
and, as previously mentioned, the "considerable experience" holding is one of only a few holdings
for which the Court ever has cited Topco. See supra note 6.
133. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, 441 U.S. 1, 20.
134. Id. at 20-23.
135. Id. at 24.
136. For a related discussion, see Streamlining Antitrust, supra note 31, at 6-7.
137. BMI, 441 U.S. at 10-16.
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the Court from the government's scrutiny is vicarious, the Court's acute com-
prehension of the government scrutiny raises doubt whether the restraint was
as novel as the Court initially maintained.'38
Whatever the present strength of the "considerable experience" require-
ment, the notion was probably more convincing in 1963139 than it is in 1989.
Even excluding Topco, the last twenty-five years have given the Supreme Court
considerable experience with a variety of horizontal restraints. Yet, cases such
as National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma'"0 indicate that the Supreme Court will accord a restraint
the rule of reason even when it shares the characteristics of those restraints
which the Court has frequently ruled unreasonable. 4 ' Moreover, NCAA in-
dicates that considerable experience is a collateral requirement-that the Court
will invoke the per se rule for reasons to which considerable experience is
a mere pendant. ' 2 Thus, it is doubtful that today's Court, if confronted with
the territorial restraint in Topco, would have the temerity to invoke an
automatic per se rule simply out of its experience with the restraint.
Another development altering the rule of reason-per se rule framework in-
volves the probable retirement of the per se categorization of horizontal
restraints introduced in Northern Pacific and extended in Topco. Merely five
years after Topco, Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 43 recognized
that procompetitive aspects of nonprice vertical restraints may warrant analysis
under the rule of reason. 14 GTE Sylvania held that a departure from the
rule of reason "must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than
... formalistic line drawing."'" BMI later extended a similar admonition
against systematically denouncing per se all horizontal restraints, even those
involving price fixing:
To the Court of Appeals and CBS, the blanket license involves
"price fixing" in the literal sense ... But this is not a question
simply of determining whether two or more competitors have literal-
ly "fixed" a "price." As generally used in the antitrust field, "price
fixing" is a shorthand way of describing certain categories of
business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable.
The Court of Appeals' literal approach does not alone establish
that this particular practice is one of those types or that it is "plainly
anticompetitive" and very likely without "redeeming virtue."
Literalness is overly simplistic and often overly broad .... Thus,
138. See id.; Streamlining Antitrust, supra note 31, at 6-7.
139. In 1963, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), first established that
"considerable experience" was necessary to invoke the per se rule. See id. at 263.
140. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See infra notes 168-95 and accompanying text.
141. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100.
142. See id. at 100 n.21.
143. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
144. Id. at 58-59.




it is necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling
within or without that category of behavior to which we apply the
label "per se price fixing."
'1 4 6
BMI's token preservation of the notion of categorical illegality belies the
notion's practical demise. Prior to BMI, a restraint itemized within Northern
Pacific had been illegal by virtue of its stigma. If, for example, a restraint
involved price fixing between potential competitors, it was accordingly labeled
"price fixing" and condemned as a matter of law.'4 7 A plaintiff challenging
the legality of a horizontal restraint merely had to identify it as one of the
trade practices blacklisted in Northern Pacific.'14
The blanket licensing in BMI clearly constituted price fixing, for it involved
the predetermination of license fees between copyright assignors.149 However,
the Court refused to place blanket licensing within the category of illegal
behavior called "per se price fixing." Because the Court could not have
conscientiously ruled that blanket licensing was not price fixing, it instead
held that not all price fixing arrangements are predominately anticompetitive.
One of the reasons the categorization principle had been so binding was
that the Court had formerly presumed, without further investigation, that
horizontal restraints serve no other purpose than to stifle competition.1 50
However, the BMI Court refused to be bound to such a restrictive presump-
tion and invoked a threshold analysis for determining whether the per se rule
was indeed the wisest method of adjudicating BMI's blanket license."' Under
this analysis, blanket licensing facially appeared to be procompetitive.' 5 2 Thus,
the threshold inquiry in BMI rebutted the Court's long-held presumption that
all horizontal restraints are inherently anticompetitive.
BMI corresponds with Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co., a 1985 group boycott case. Pacific Stationery
ruled that a "plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must present a
threshold case that the challenged activity falls into a category likely to have
predominately anticompetitive effects."1 54 Because not all group boycotts are
predominately anticompetitive, the Court held the rule of reason applicable.'55
Although BMI and Pacific Stationery appear to have preserved the notion
of categorization, they disposed of the traditional blacklist-type of categoriza-
146. BMI, 441 U.S. at 8-9. The Court concluded, "That will often, but not always, be a
simple matter." Id. (footnote omitted).
147. See Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
148. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 608-09, 611.
149. See BMI, 441 U.S. at 5.
150. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
151. BMI, 441 U.S. at 19-20.
152. Id. at 20.
153. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
154. Id. at 298.
155. Id. Northern Pac. Ry. had listed the group boycott as one of the restraints presumptively
illegal. See Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
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tion used by prior Supreme Courts. In its place, they established a per se
category into which a horizontal restraint would be placed only if, upon a
threshold examination, the restraint's probable effects were determined
predominately anticompetitive. Thus, BMI and Pacific Stationery arrested the
Northern Pacific/Topco concept of categorization and returned the law to
the purer balancing approach initially emphasized in Chicago Board of
Trade. 1 " 6
This emerging re-emphasis on the substance of each restraint rather than
on its form seems hindered by a conflicting portion of the recent Business
Electronics opinion. 5 7 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, initially extended
the attention to substance to the definition of a trade restraint. He asserted
that "[the term 'restraint of trade' refers not to a particular list of agreements,
but to a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances."' Justice
Scalia then explained that just as the term "restraint of trade" and the rule
of reason evolve with the commercial environment, so too does the notion
of per se illegality.' 59 This seems to bolster the Court's attempts in BMI and
Northern Pacific to quietly suppress the principle to categorization.
However, these general advancements in Business Electronics are at odds
with subsequent language in the opinion. The Court ultimately affirmed a
Fifth Circuit decision that a vertical restraint is not per se illegal unless it
involves an express or implied agreement on price or price levels. 16 0 The peti-
tioner had contended that, because certain horizontal agreements had been
determined illegal per se though they did not involve price-fixing, it was er-
roneous to require that a vertical agreement involve price-fixing before it too
became illegal.' 6' Yet, in distinguishing horizontal agreements from vertical
ones, the majority, citing Topco, revived the principle of categorization by
an awkward, unrelated reference to territorial exclusivity:
This notion of equivalence between the scope of horizontal per
se illegality and that of vertical per se illegality was explicitly re-
jected in GTE Sylvania, . . . as it had to be, since a horizontal
agreement to divide territories is per se illegal, . . . while GTE
Sylvania held that a vertical agreement to do so is not. 2
This irrelevant language seems to approve the per se treatment of any
horizontal division of territories. However, the preceding portion of Business
Electronics extends the Supreme Court's prior departure from the stale con-
cept of routine adjudication according to a restraint's attributed label.
It is difficult to assign much weight to the majority's dictum on horizontal
156. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
157. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct, 1515 (1988).
158. Id. at 4391.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 4392.
161. Id. at 4391.




market divisions for several reasons. First, the Court had not voiced such
a broad proscription or cited Topco for its authority in years.' 3 Furthermore,
the Court sprang its surprise assault on horizontal market divisions, without
discussion, in a completely unrelated vertical restraint case, Finally, the Business
Electronics opinion as a whole, in keeping with its recent precedent, clearly
abates the idea that certain types of restraints are forever condemned in spite
of their utility in an evolving marketplace.
Given the Business Electronics opinion in its entirety and precedent such
as BMI and Pacific Stationery which truncate the notion of categorization,
it remains probable that the Northern Pacific/Topco principle of categoriza-
tion has been discarded. If this is true, its demise poses two ramifications.
First, a plaintiff challenging the legality of a particular horizontal restraint
must now initially show that the restraint is likely to have predominately anti-
competitive effects, This showing of anticompetitive predominance is a more
difficult burden of proof than the previous apparent requirement of merely
establishing that the challenged conduct fits within the traditional per se
category.' 4 Second, because the plaintiff's burden of proof established in
Pacific Stationery involves a factual matter, a rational determination of the
case requires analysis-a threshold analysis similar to, but probably less
elaborate 6 ' than, a rule of reason analysis of the challenged restraint. Still,
a threshold inquiry increases the likelihood that a horizontal restraint will
be examined under the rule of reason, because it may remove a court's
preconception that the restraint is inherently illegal.'
The erosion of per se categorization is arguably beneficial to the prudent
adjudication of trade restraints. As Chief Justice Burger noted in his Topco
dissent, the Sherman Act has assigned the courts to determine the validity
of restraints, even when those determinations are made difficult by economic
complexities.' 6 1 However, the credibility of the shift away from the per se
rule toward the rule of reason has also been marred by the Supreme Court's
attempts to analyze a restraint that is naked on its face. The case of National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma' represents an example of this disservice.
163. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
164. A noted antitrust lawyer has written that in addition to the Pacific Stationery burden
of proof, a plaintiff must also initially prove that the challenged conduct is within a traditional
per se category of offense. Pasahow, Erosion of the Per Se Rule: Trend in the Law of Horizon-
tal Restraints, 2 ANTITRUST 22, 25 (Fall 1987).
165. See Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
166. A number of federal courts, however, continue to generally subject vertical restraints
to the rule of reason and horizontal restraints to the per se rule. E.g., M&H Tire Co. v. Hoosier
Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 978 (1st Cir. 1984); Oreck Corp, v. Whirlpool Corp., 579
F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1979); Smith Int'l Inc. v.
Kennametal, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 79, 87-88 (D.C. Ohio 1985); L. C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon
Corp., 625 F. Supp. 477, 487 (M.D. N.C. 1985).
167. Topco, 405 U.S. at 620, 624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
168. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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The NCAA, as part of its regulation of intercollegiate athletics, adopted
a plan to govern telecasts of college football games.' 69 The plan, in part, limited
the number of games that any one member-college could televise. No college
could sell television rights independently. Instead, members were limited to
negotiations with only two networks, and prices were prearranged by the
NCAA.'70 Several colleges, dissatisfied with these limitations, negotiated a
contract with a third network that guaranteed them more television appearances
for more money than did the NCAA plan."' In response, the NCAA
threatened sanctions against any dissenting college that performed the con-
tract. Several of the colleges then brought suit under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, challenging the NCAA's restraints.7 2
The NCAA television plan recited that it was designed to reduce the adverse
effect of live television upon football game attendance.' The NCAA further
asserted at trial that its television policies "tended to preserve a competitive
balance" among the football programs of its members.' 74 The district court
disagreed and ruled that the television plan constituted illegal per se price
fixing.' 7 The Tenth Circuit affirmed this holding.' 76 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower courts' condemnation of the plan but refused to apply the
per se rule.' 77 Instead, the Court adopted a perplexing version of the rule
of reason.
NCAA represents an extreme departure from prior decisions, because the
majority settled on the rule of reason even after acknowledging that the televi-
sion plan was a "naked restraint on price and output" and exclusively anti-
competitive.' Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained the basis
for its deviation:
[W]e have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per
se rule to this case. This decision is not based on a lack of judicial
experience with this type of arrangement, on the fact that the
NCAA is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on our respect for
the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement
of intercollegiate amateur athletics. Rather, what is critical is that
this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on com-
petition are essential if the product' 79 is to be available at all."'
169. Id. at 88, 91-92.
170. Id. at 92-94.
171. Id. at 94-95.
172. Id. at 95.
173. Id. at 91.
174. Id. at 96.
175. Id.; Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1319 (W.D.
Okla. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
176. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1162.
177. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100, 120.
178. Id. at 104-06, 110, 114.
179. The opinion later identified the product as "competition itself-contests between com-
peting institutions." Id. at 101.
180. Id. at 100-01 (footnotes omitted).
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The opinion subsequently noted the plaintiffs' concession that certain essen-
tial restraints enhanced competition among member institutions.' 8 ' Such essen-
tial restraints included the regulation of team size, physical violence and class
attendance.' 82 The procompetitive virtues of these restraints included preser-
vation of academic character, expanded opportunities for student athletes and
broadened consumer choice. 83
However, such essential regulations as team size, physical violence and class
attendance were not at issue in NCAA. The case involved only the television
plan which restricted price and output. The plan was not even remotely related
to the body of restraints that the Court deemed essential to the product's
existence. Yet, Justice Stevens inexplicably reasoned that the necessity and
procompetitive character of the legitimate regulations required the Court to
consider the NCAA's justifications for an unrelated restraint that was plainly
anticompetitive and quite inessential to the existence and integrity of college
football. " As a result, he applied the rule of reason when he clearly should
have applied the per se rule.' S
The Court's incorrect choice of analysis unsurprisingly resulted in faulty
reasoning. In earlier cases, a traditional rule of reason analysis included a
"consideration of the facts peculiar to the business in which the restraint (was)
applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects, and the history of the
restraint and the reasons for its adoption."'16 The drawback of the tradi-
tional analysis was that it usually was "elaborate ... incredibly complicated
and prolonged.' 87 However, the NCAA Court's analysis entailed no com-
plexities of this sort; if anything, it mocked the traditional analysis. Although
the Court's drawn-out statement of facts could be interpreted as a consideration
of the NCAA's circumstances and the details of the restraint, the substantive
portion of the opinion did not expound on these facts. Instead, the opinion,
as one commentator observed, emphasized the television plan's anticompetitive
aspects with such force that it constituted an explanation of why the Court
should have applied the per se rule.' 88
The NCAA, the petitioner in the case, presented four arguments: (1) its
plan could not have a significant anticompetitive effect because the NCAA
lacked market power; 89 (2) the plan constituted a cooperative joint venture
181. Id. at 103.
182. Id. at 101.
183. Id. at 102-03. The Court cited BMI, 441 U.S. at 18-23, and GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. at 51-57, and noted that "[a] restraint in a limited aspect of the market may actually enhance
marketwide competition." NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103.
184. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117.
185. For a parallel discussion, see Antitrust Developments, supra note 31, at 1053-61.
186. Topco, 405 U.S. at 607 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918)).
187. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
188. See Antitrust Developments, supra note 31, at 1055.
189. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 (Court holding that, as a matter of law, proof of market power
is irrelevant in rule of reason cases). But cf. Pacific Stationery, 472 U.S. at 298 ("When the
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that was procompetitive because it assisted in the marketing of broadcast
rights; 19 (3) the plan was necessary to protect live attendance;'"' and (4) the
plan helped maintain a competitive balance among college football teams." 2
Justice Stevens refuted each argument by unduly emphasizing the exclusively
anticompetitive nature of the television plan in language reminiscent of the
most stern per se opinions, such as Sealy and Topco. "1
The pretense of NCAA's "analysis," once discovered, should alert one to
the principal failure of the opinion. That is, the Court errantly determined
that the television plan should be judged under the rule of reason but then
condemned the plan under the per se rule. The Court initially rejected a deter-
mination of per se illegality, explaining that "per se rules are invoked when
surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so
great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged con-
duct,"' 94 Yet, on the heels of that explanation followed language that can
hardly be said to buttress the Court's selection of the rule of reason:
Because it restrains price and output, the NCAA's television plan
has a significant potential for anticompetitive effects. The findings
of the District Court indicate that this potential has been realized
.... [I]t is clear that the NCAA controls utterly destroy free
market competition .... The anticompetitive consequences of this
arrangement are apparent. Individual competitors lose their freedom
to compete. Price is higher and output lower than they would other-
wise be, and both are unresponsive to consumer preference."'
In the final analysis, NCAA represents a grave deterioration of established
antitrust doctrine. An admittedly "naked" restraint was subjected to some
unprecedented mutation of conventional analysis purported to be the rule of
reason. The Court demoted the traditionally extensive rule of reason analysis
to a one-sided survey of anticompetitive tendencies-a song and dance prelude
to the per se rule. Consequently, NCAA has now put at risk the credibility
of a rule of reason analysis in a situation where a traditionally extensive analysis
is needed.
NCAA's negative influence is especially blatant in Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.'96 In that recent case, the Supreme
Court unanimously chose to evaluate, under the rule of reason, an agreement
by which competing dentists refused to submit X-rays to insurance companies
plaintiff challenges expulsion from a joint buying cooperative, some showing must be made that
the cooperative possesses market power or unique access to a business element necessary for
effective competition.").
190. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113.
191. Id. at 116.
192. Id. at 117.
193. See id. at 109-20; Antitrust Developments, supra note 31, at 1055-60.
194. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103-04 (footnote omitted).
195. Id. at 104-07, 106 n.30 (footnotes and citations omitted).




in conjunction with claim forms.19' Dental insurers used the X-rays to help
determine whether the dentists were treating insured patients by the least ex-
pensive yet adequate means."9 8
The Court "decline[d] to resolve this case by forcing the Federation's policy
into the (group) 'boycott' pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule."' 99 After
selecting the rule of reason, however, the opinion smacked of per se rule
language:
While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis
is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such
an agreement."'
A concerted and effective effort to withhold (or make more costly)
information desired by consumers for the purpose of determining
whether a particular purchase is cost-justified is likely enough to
disrupt the proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism of
the market that it may be condemned even absent proof that it
resulted in higher prices or, as here, the purchase of higher-priced
services, than would occur in its absence.2 0'
Thus, Federation of Dentists, true to NCAA, initially announced that the
group boycott at issue was to be adjudged under the rule of reason. However,
because the boycott required no elaborate industry analysis to determine its
manifest anticompetitiveness, the rule of reason analysis became no more than
a lengthened per se rule discussion.
Summary of Today's Law on Horizontal Restraints
In summary, several Supreme Court opinions, notably NCAA, have quieted
Topco's legacy. These opinions have radically altered the judiciary's views
on horizontal restraints. Only Business Electronics, however, has contributed
to the time-honored ancillary restraints doctrine, stating in dicta that a valid
restraint may be ancillary to a relationship and need not accompany an ex-
press contractual provision. The Court in other opinions has posited only that
Judge Taft constructed the ancillary restraints doctrine upon his interpreta-
tion of the rule of reason. Yet, the fallacy of this explanation should not
weaken the fact that the ancillary restraints doctrine is still a sound model
197. Id. at 2014, 2018. The Court selected the rule of reason on three grounds: (1) the Court
considered the per se rule limited in group boycott cases to situations where a defendant with
market power boycotts suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from dealing with
his competitor; (2) the Court preferred the rule of reason in cases involving professional associa-
tion rules; and (3) the Court believed that the economic impact of the dentists' agreement was
not immediately obvious. See id. at 2018.
198. Id. at 2013.
199. Id. at 2018.
200. Id. (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978)).
201. Id. at 2019.
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for trade restraint analysis and is available to any court so enlightened as
to perceive its independent relevance.
The rule of reason and the per se rule, on the other hand, seem to change
unrelentingly. Perhaps this is because blanket holdings such as Topco remain
unmodified while the Court speeds down the path of antitrust progression.
For whatever reasons of jurisprudence, the rule of reason/per se rule struc-
ture is different today for several reasons. First, the role of judicial experience,
which may have once largely determined the applicability of the per se rule,
is today subordinated to other factors. Notwithstanding BMI, the Supreme
Court will, according to NCAA, examine under the rule of reason a restraint
with which the Court has ample experience. Today, it is doubtful that con-
siderable experience with a restraint will be enough to condemn it per se.
Second, unless Business Electronics' pointless jab at horizontal territorial
divisions is to be taken seriously, today's Supreme Court is unlikely to
categorize any restraint per se illegal simply because it is horizontal. Moreover,
such a restraint probably will not be denounced merely because it resembles
one of the restraints black-listed in Northern Pacific. Today's plaintiff has
a stricter burden of proof than twenty years ago. The plaintiff must initially
show that the restraint is likely to have predominately anticompetitive effects.
In accordance with BMI, the Court will perform a threshold analysis of the
restraint's likely effect on competition to determine whether to apply the per
se rule. This facial inquiry could bring under the rule of reason a restraint
that, twenty years ago, would not have escaped categorical illegality.
Finally, today's Court will subject even a "naked" restraint to the rule
of reason in certain conditions. Defendants, however, should bridle their en-
thusiasm over the potential of such an analysis of their restraints. As NCAA
and Federation of Dentists show, when the Court inappropriately applies the
rule of reason in lieu of the per se rule, the resulting analysis ultimately reverts
to a per se rule discussion, and the restraint is condemned.
IV. Topco Today
To most accurately predict the Court's probable position on Topco today,
at least two district court scenarios must be developed: one in which the district
court's decision mirrors that of the 1970 Topco decision by the Northern
District Court of Illinois;202 and another in whiph the district court hypothetical-
ly holds Topco's territorial limitations per se illegal. The reason for both
scenarios is that the Northern District upheld Topco's restraints by utilizing
the ancillary restraints doctrine.203 Because the Supreme Court apparently
misunderstands the doctrine, the Court's present views might be more prac-
tically predicted upon its review of a hypothetical per se ruling. Moreover,
202. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 405
U.S. 596 (1972).




it would be too speculative to hypothecate a rule of reason opinion by the
district court, because, today, the degree of analysis under the rule can widely
vary.
The Topco Court heavily relied upon its considerable experience with
horizontal restraints in ruling all such restraints, including the division of
markets at issue, per se illegal. 20 ' NCAA indicates that this experience would
not preclude today's Court from analyzing Topco's restriction if the Court
felt so compelled. Furthermore, the BMI Court's alleged insufficient experience
seemed to merely play a supplemental role in the Court's decision to forego
the per se rule for a more productive analysis. Therefore, under either district
court scenario, it is unlikely that today's Supreme Court would place much
emphasis on its experience with territorial restraints in determining how the
restraint in Topco should be treated.
Subsequent decisions eroded the primary foundation on which Topco ruled
horizontal restraints per se illegal-categorical illegality. BMI, NCAA and
Federation of Dentists show that not all horizontal restraints are considered,
or at least initially declared, per se illegal. Furthermore, BMI and Pacific
Stationery effectively discarded Northern Pacific's blacklist of historically il-
legal horizontal restraints. Because of this and other developments of law
discussed above, the Court has effectively overruled Topco.2°" However, at-
tention must be given to Business Electronics' untimely resurrection of Topco,
to the extent that the latter ruled horizontal territorial divisions per se illegal.
Still, because Topco's purposes for rejecting the territorial restraints no
longer coincide with settled antitrust theory (and arguably never did), it is
presumable that today's Supreme Court would affirm the district court's
holding which was based on the ancillary restraints doctrine. The Court would
probably maintain that the trial court properly applied the "rule of reason"
and then possibly conduct its own analysis, whatever form that might assume.
Turning to the hypothetical per se ruling, one of the ramifications stemming
from post-Topco antitrust developments is that a plaintiff must now show
that the challenged conduct is likely to have predominately anticompetitive
effects. In Topco, the government complained that intrabrand competition
was diminished and argued that the territorial limitations were per se illegal,
"even if the ultimate result of these practices may be an overall increase
in supermarket competition." 2 6 The government presented no live witnesses,
only documents obtained in discovery and several advertisements from one
newspaper in which two different local chains advertised Topco-labeled pro-
ducts, presumably by Topco's permission."'
204. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. Rothery Storage and Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.
1986). Judge Robert Bork reasoned that the United States Supreme Court in BMI, NCAA and
Pacific Stationery returned to the ancillary restraints doctrine and thus effectively overruled Topco
and Sealy. Id. at 226, 229.
206. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
207. See id. at 1036-37.
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The Supreme Court today would not likely affirm a per se holding arising
from these allegations, even if proven. The burden of proof established in
Pacific Stationery would not be met. It is not enough that a restraint has
anticompetitive attributes; rather, the government must show that those at-
tributes would likely dominate procompetitive ones. 08 Because the govern-
ment would fail to meet its burden of proof, the Court would overrule the
hypothetical trial court's per se decision and would analyze, to whatever extent,
Topco's practices under the rule of reason.
The Court at this point would be placed at a juristic crossroads. The govern-
ment conceded at trial that Topco's private label program increased competi-
tion in the supermarket industry.0 Topco maintained that territorial exclusivity
was indispensible to an effective private label program. ' " Yet, Topco never
contended that its challenged practices were likely procompetitive.
The pleadings in Topco unveil the shortcomings of the traditional rule of
reason. The rule works well in the adjudication of a restraint that has pro-
competitive virtues, such as blanket licensing in BMI. However, the rule of
reason falls short in the adjudication of a restraint which itself bears no pro-
competitive virtues but which is necessary to effect the overriding pro-
competitive virtues of a business practice having a greater legitimate purpose.
This shortfall occurs because the rule, when traditionally applied, focuses only
on the restraint, which in the second instance is anticompetitive by itself, yet
reasonable in the total scheme. A properly conducted analysis under the rule
of reason would ultimately find Topco's territorial exclusivity unreasonable,
regardless of its necessity to the private label program. If the necessity is real,
the rule of reason as traditionally applied would lend injustice to Topco
members.
This juncture may only be traversed by asserting how Topco should be
analyzed today-under the ancillary restraints doctrine. The doctrine would
permit an examination of the procompetitive effects of private labeling and
the Topco cooperative. It would also permit a critique of the necessity of
territorial exclusivity to Topco's program of private labeling and whether ter-
ritorial exclusivity is ancillary to the program-that is, whether the anti-
competitive division of markets is subordinate and collateral to, yet necessary
for, the procompetitive private label program. The rule of reason, strictly
applied, would result in certain condemnation of Topco's conduct, notwith-
standing the Court's latest failures to actually adhere to the rule. However,
the ancillary restraints doctrine, strictly applied, could result in a finding either
for Topco or for the Justice Department. Either way, the Court would ulti-
mately chart a rational path of antitrust consistency by determining Topco
on the basis of its facts using a model of analysis that would not, by its in-
herent shortcomings, prematurely determine the outcome.
208. See Pacific Stationery, 472 U.S. at 298.
209. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
210. Id. at 1036, 1040.
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.211 that
the horizontal territorial restraint at issue was illegal because all horizontal
restraints are illegal. The Court inaccurately alleged that the district court
had applied the rule of reason, and then the Court rejected that application.
However, the district court upheld Topco's territorial division by analyzing
the practice under the ancillary restraints doctrine. The essential inquiry of
the rule of reason is whether the restraint itself enhances competition."' The
primary focus of the ancillary restraints doctrine, however, is on the legitimate
main purpose of an underlying contract or relationship and whether the
restraint, anticompetitive as it may be, is ancillary to that main purpose and
essential for its fruition. Because the trial court in Topco correctly utilized
the ancillary restraints doctrine-a sound, balanced model of trade restraint
analysis that is rooted in the common law2 1 3 and has found favor with the
Supreme Court214-the trial court's holding that the restraint was reasonable
should have been affirmed.
Furthermore, antitrust developments since Topco have eroded its reasons
for ruling all horizontal restraints per se illegal. Today's Court probably will
not rule a restraint per se illegal simply because the Court has considerable
experience with that type of restraint. Nor will the Court brand a restraint
illegal per se simply because it is horizontal or is associated with one of the
restraints itemized in Northern Pacific. In fact, as NCAA has shown, even
naked restraints can be scrutinized under the rule of reason. Yet, when a naked
restraint is improperly subjected to an examination for its procompetitive
possibilities, NCAA also shows that the examination will constitute a de facto
per se condemnation.
For these reasons, today's Supreme Court would probably approve of the
district court's analysis in Topco and affirm the decision. However, the Court
continues to misunderstand the independent significance of the ancillary
restraints doctrine, the basis of the district court's opinion. The Court would
therefore probably affirm the trial court's decision by finding that it validly
applied the "rule of reason." Had the Topco district court invoked the per
se rule, today's Supreme Court would likely reverse the decision by holding
that the government had not met its burden of proving that the restraint was
likely to be predominately anticompetitive. However, a credible rule of reason
analysis would fare Topco's territorial divisions no better than would a per
se ruling, since these restraints were never alleged or found at trial to be pro-
competitive. Because a rule of reason opinion would denounce Topco's restraint
without properly analyzing the restraint's necessity to the procompetitive private
label program, the ancillary restraints doctrine offers the most consummate
and objective analysis by which to accurately adjudge Topco's restraint.
211. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
212. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104.
213. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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